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1 
FOREWORD: 
COMPETITION’S ACHILLES HEEL 
THOMAS L. GREANEY* 
The Achilles heel of competition is concentration. Markets dominated by a 
single or a few buyers or sellers protected by barriers to entry do not perform 
efficiently. In the health care sector, market imperfections and extensive 
regulation further complicate matters, as conventional economic analyses need 
to account for their distortive effects.1 Often misunderstood as the guarantor of 
competitive market conditions, antitrust law has only a constrained role to play 
in dealing with the problem of what I refer to as “extant market power.”2 That 
is, where mergers or organic growth has resulted in highly concentrated market 
structures (e.g., three or fewer rivals)—as is the case in many health provider 
and payor markets—antitrust law is largely tolerant of high prices unless those 
in dominant positions collude or abuse their market position by exclusion or 
other improper means. Moreover, economic analyses indicate that some 
important accretions in market power occur in circumstances that have largely 
escaped antitrust challenge, e.g., vertical cross-market combinations, have the 
potential to cause significant harm to consumers.3  
The resulting challenge for health care competition policy is finding ways 
to curb the exercise of extant market power and, where possible, to expand the 
capacity of antitrust or regulatory measures that inhibit the ability to obtain 
dominance. There are, to be sure, reasons to question the advisability of some of 
the ad hoc measures undertaken by antitrust enforcers and state legislatures to 
address provider market power. For example, some state attorneys general have 
negotiated so-called “conduct remedies” that allow mergers by dominant 
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hospitals to go forward while imposing certain restrictions on the behavior of 
the merged entity. These remedial provisions have included restrictions on 
raising prices to commercial insurers, promises that the merged entity will 
negotiate in “good faith,” and provisions that require the merging parties to 
employ “separate and independent” negotiating teams when contracting with 
payors.4 These home remedies are in my view inherently flawed. Besides the 
difficulty of crafting ex ante solutions, they are difficult for government agencies 
to implement and monitor, and do not address entrenched market power; 
moreover, there are issues of institutional competence in investing regulatory 
supervision over a complex and rapidly changing business environment in 
courts, as one state court acknowledged in refusing to accept such a decree.5 
Another deeply flawed approach adopted in several states is the 
establishment of regulatory agencies that issue certificates of public advantage 
(COPAs) that immunize anti-competitive mergers while subjecting the merged 
hospital to regulatory controls on price and a variety of other matters. The 
standards for approving mergers under these statutes are numerous, conflicting, 
and not subject to empirical analysis or measurement and hence subject to risks 
of capture by the regulated entity.6 Moreover, the nation’s experience with 
certificate of need and rate regulation of hospital charges counsels against 
adopting open-ended rate regulation in this manner. Application of state COPA 
statutes have caused the Federal Trade Commission to abandon antitrust 
challenges to mergers to near monopoly in West Virginia7 and the Tennessee-
Virginia border area.8  
Some states are turning to capping provider rates using supervisory 
regulation of commercial insurance. Regulatory approaches range from open-
ended regulation of insurance rates designed to intensify payors’ resistance to 
provider price increases to more targeted designs that cap the prices of dominant 
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providers.9 Other states are exploring more thoroughgoing regulation including 
single-payor options.10 This newfound enthusiasm for rate regulation, notably 
visible even in some red states, underscores the fact that market power has 
become a central issue in health law and policy. 
This symposium brings together an impressive collection of individuals 
from academic, public policy, and legal practice sectors to examine the issue of 
concentration in health care.11 The articles include several taking a close look at 
the promise and gaps in antitrust enforcement. Anne Marie Helm provides a 
thorough overview of the hurdles faced by private litigants in bringing antitrust 
lawsuits.12 Jaime King and Erin Fuse Brown dissect an important phenomenon 
yet to be addressed by antitrust enforcement, the creation of “system” market 
power by cross-market mergers.13 A second theme of the symposium is the 
interplay of regulation and competition policy in health care. Emilio Varanini 
offers insights as to the role of state legislation, regulation, and law enforcement 
in buttressing the effectiveness of market competition in serving the public 
good.14 Zack Buck takes a close look at the rapid emergence of managed care in 
Medicaid, analyzing the bidding processes used to inject competition into the 
program and the regulation and litigation encountered in several states that 
employed competitive bidding.15 Finally, Robert Berenson delves into the 
regulatory structures governing traditional Medicare and Medicare Advantage,16 
an issue that was front and center in the government’s successful challenge to 
the merger of Aetna and Humana.17 His analysis reveals the central role 
regulation plays in shaping competition in Medicare Advantage and raises 
important issues regarding the advisability of converting Medicare to a premium 
support system.  
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This symposium marks the end of my twenty-nine year career at Saint Louis 
University. In that time, I have had the opportunity to interact with some of the 
leading scholars, practitioners, and policy experts in some twenty-nine health 
law symposia. Further it has been both a pleasure and an honor to work with my 
wonderful faculty colleagues and outstanding students in building and 
maintaining the nation’s leading health law center. I am grateful to all for their 
friendship and support. 
 
